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Electoral Democracy – 2020 in the Light of Public Choice Theory: Lessons in Institutional Design for Russia

https://doi.org/10.21686/2073-1051-2021-1-62-79

Abstract

2020 was marked by major landmark events. First of all, there is the political crisis in the United  States  related  to  the  presidential  elections.  Secondly,  there  is  the  UK’s  secession from the EU. Finally, there is the unexpected return to power of left-wing forces in some Latin American countries. This forces us to return to the foundations and conclusions of the theory of public choice – a tool that allowed us to analyze and predict the political and economic behavior of modern electoral democracies.The paper states that the erosion of the middle class leads to the dominance of minorities and their priorities. The position of the median voter is losing its former significance. As a result, the political duopoly becomes unstable, in contrast to the model of political pluralism (oligopoly). The desire of middle-income countries with a high degree of social differentiation to  adopt  a  bipartisan  system  in  the  hope  that  this  will  ensure  political  stability  must  be mistaken. In contrary to what was said, the construct of American federalism, which many scholars  consider  archaic,  effectively  defends  horizontal  democracy  and  discourages  the imposition of values by aggressive minority coalitions. The use of one or another modification of the «electoral colleges» in the presidential and parliamentary elections would strengthen the federal principles of horizontal democracy in Russia. The article presents an analysis of two main approaches to the analysis of corruption – as «opportunistic behavior of an agent in the principal-agent model», and as «status rent». Criticism of the latter approach reveals the view of Russia as an «institutional mutant». Authors who interpret corruption as «status rent» tend to ignore the rent-seeking behavior of actors in rich countries. The article substantiates the idea of transferring to Russia the American legislation regulating the  behavior  of  lobbyists,  the  contribution  of  funds  to  the  electoral  funds  of  parties  and politicians. Such a transplant will dramatically reduce the volume of domestic corruption, while at the same time making the «electoral machines» much more transparent.

About the Author

P. A. Orekhovsky
Federal State Budgetary Institution of Science Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Federal State Budget Educational Institution of Higher Education «Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation»
Russian Federation

OREKHOVSKY Petr А. - Dr. Sc. (Econ.), Professor, Chief Researcher – Head of Sector of Philosophy and Methodology of Economy Science, Chief Researcher

 32, Nakhimovsky Av., Moscow, 117218.

49, Leningradsky Av., Moscow, 125993



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Review

For citations:


Orekhovsky P.A. Electoral Democracy – 2020 in the Light of Public Choice Theory: Lessons in Institutional Design for Russia. Federalism. 2021;(1):62-79. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.21686/2073-1051-2021-1-62-79

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ISSN 2073-1051 (Print)